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 Bilateral Relationships Governed
 by Incomplete Contracts
 by
 Mehmet Bac
 This paper explores implications of interactions between noncontractibility of
 quality, multidimensional hidden information, switching costs and the frequency
 of trade on the terms of contracts in a buyer-seller setup. Optimal contractual
 arrangements are shown to consist of a sequence of two contracts with nonde-
 creasing prices and nonincreasing quality and volume of exchange. In the ab-
 sence of switching costs, an increase in the frequency of trade is absorbed by the
 first contract. For high frequencies of trade, switching costs may enhance welfare
 by improving the efficiency of screening through a better allocation of time
 between contracts. (JEL: L 14)
 1. Introduction
 A growing literature focusing on institutional arrangements when complete
 contracts are not feasible has emerged from the insights of Alchian and
 Demsetz [1972] and Williamson [1975]. Examples are Tiróle [1986] on pro-
 curement contracts, Hart and Moore [1988] on renegotiations of incomplete
 contracts, Farrell and Shapiro [1989] on switching costs, and MacLeod and
 Malcomson [1988] and Hosios and Peters [1993] in the labor context. The
 incomplete contracts approach of Grossman and Hart [1986] and Hart and
 Moore [1990] has also contributed substantially to our understanding of the
 nature of the firm.
 This paper considers a discrete-time variant of the incomplete contracting
 model introduced in Bac [1993] to study the evolution of prices, qualities and
 the volume of trade, and to derive implications of introducing exogenous
 switching costs. It also investigates how the contractual arrangement responds
 to an increase in the frequency of trade.
 The model comprises a buyer with noncontractible idiosyncratic needs and
 a pool of potential sellers with private information about their quality-relevant
 characteristics. The type of a seller is decomposed into two components. Sellers
 differ not only in their innate values (a quality shifting parameter), but also in
 their cost of effort. The innate value is a substitute for quality, as for example
 job-specific abilities are for performance in the labor context. But quality can
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 also be improved through effort. Thanks to this decomposition of the sellers'
 types, the buyer's learning process is nontrivial; it is complicated by the possi-
 bility that a "bad" seller imitates the performance of a "good" seller by exerting
 a sufficiently high effort.
 In a bilateral monopoly framework, Bac [1993] showed the importance of
 learning about innate values for the buyer (the uninformed party) in choosing
 contract terms, and that the number of governing contracts is limited to two.
 Prices and, as we show here, the volume of trade, cannot be made contingent
 on quality but rather serve screening purposes. We derive further implications
 concerning the evolution of the parties' relative bargaining powers. Though the
 buyer faces many potential trading partners, hence retains considerable bar-
 gaining power at the outset, this power is partly captured by the selected seller
 as he transmits type-related information, possibly by exerting effort. A bilateral
 monopoly develops through the contractual arrangement where, after a proba-
 tionary first contract, the seller who proves a high innate value in equilibrium
 is "tenured" with a second contract.
 These featues of the model accord well with those observed in real-life
 contracting practices where the transactions involved are rather idiosyncratic.
 First, the emergence of a bilateral monopoly through the relationship is a
 salient feature of many actual settings such as labor, lending-borrowing and
 vertical buyer-seller relationships. The standard explanation for this phe-
 nomenon is the building up of reciprocal relationship-specific investments. In
 this model it is learning: Continuation dominates switching partners when a
 good matching prevails. Second, the evolution of the parties' bargaining powers
 is associated with an increasing profile of prices, which finds ample support in
 the labor context.1 We therefore show that these features may be generated by
 the interaction between contract incompleteness and workers' private, perfor-
 mance-relevant information. Third, the analysis provides insights about the role
 of frictions in dynamic relationships. Frictions, or in their most simple form,
 exogenous switching costs, are natural aspects of many long-term relationships.
 It is widely believed that such switching costs enlarge the scope for opportunism
 (e.g., Klemperer [1987], Farrell and Shapiro [1988]), but the analysis identi-
 fies an environment in which the opposite happens. Especially if the parties
 transact quite frequently, increasing the switching cost of one of the parties can
 be mutually beneficial even in the absence of direct mechanisms to check the
 hazard of opportunism. The key to this result is the potential conflict between
 1 Among the theories that explain why wages grow with seniority, the most closely
 linked to this paper are Malcomson's [1984] rank order tournament whereby the best
 performing young workers can win the prize of a wage greater than marginal product
 when old, and Holmstrom's [1982] analysis of provision of intertemporal managerial
 incentives. An important feature of these models and the present one is the reversal of the
 ratchet problem: dynamics has a positive influence on effort. Other explanations of wage
 patterns based on human capital theory using "delayed payment contracts" include
 Carmichael [1983] and Harris and Holmstrom [1982].
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 the buyer's ex-ante screening motive and ex-post switching incentives. We show
 that endogenous switching costs in the form of cancellation fees may eliminate
 this conflict and even increase the efficiency of screening through a better
 allocation of time among the governing contracts.
 The paper is organized as follows. The basic model is presented in section 2.
 Section 3 investigates the response of contractual arrangements to increasing
 the frequency of trade, and section 4 looks at the role of switching costs.
 Section 5 contains a summary and concluding remarks.
 2. The Model
 A buyer with idiosyncratic needs (called quality and denoted q) faces many
 potential sellers. Court ordering with respect to other aspects of trade, such as
 the unit price p, the quantity Q to be delivered to the buyer, cancellation fees,
 and durations of contracts, is assumed efficacious. There are two periods.2 The
 per-period utility function of the buyer is U(Q, q,p) = u(Q, q) - pQ, where
 u(Q, q) is concave and increasing in both Q and q. Quality is affected by effort
 x exerted per unit of output, and by the seller's innate value 9 through the
 following simple technology (assumption 1):
 (Al) q(ß,x) = 0 + x.
 The buyer observes quality but not the effort. Besides 0, the seller's type has a
 second component /?, a parameter measuring the convexity of his effort-disutil-
 ity function d(ß; x). The type {0, ß} of a seller is his private knowledge, where
 0 g {9H, 9L} and ß e [ß, J5). We assume that 0 and ß are independently distribut-
 ed, with n = prob (9 = 9H) and ß is distributed on [ß, ß] with a continuous,
 strictly positive density function. We have 9H > 0L, so a fl^-seller has an
 absolute advantage in providing quality.
 The per-period utility of a seller with effort-disutility parameter ß is
 o = [p - c - d(ß; x)] Q if he is on contract with the buyer. The constant mar-
 ginal production cost net of quality effort is denoted c, therefore total marginal
 cost is c + d(ß; x) for an output of quality 0f H- x. We make the following
 assumptions about d(ß; x):
 (A 2) (i) d(ß; x) is convex and increasing in x, and d(ß; 0) = 0 for all ß; (ii)
 there exists a finite level of effort, x(ß) such that d{ß'x) -» oo as
 x -► x(ß) for all ß; (Hi) given ßx > ß2, we have xißj > x(ß2). Fur-
 thermore, d(ß1;x)<d(ß2;x) and ddiß,; x)/dx < dd(ß2; x)/dx for
 all*.
 A seller with a higher ß has a higher effort capacity and a lower absolute and
 marginal effort disutility at all effort levels. To exemplify this decomposition of
 2 The implications of increasing the number of periods are studied in section 3.
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 types, in the context of employment relationships ß would be a measure of
 laboriousness and a high innate value would represent a talented, creative type.
 Two implications of this setting should be mentioned at this stage. First,
 noncontractibility of quality severely limits the potential types of contractual
 arrangements. Second, noncontractibility of quality and hidden type-informa-
 tion together generate the potential for the use of effort to conceal differential
 innate values because the two are substitutes. For example, this phenomenon
 manifests itself in the labor context where a less talented but hardworking
 employee occasionally performs better than a highly talented employee, and in
 vertical relationships where "bad" sellers invest to provide a temporary quality
 improvement and satisfy the buyer's needs, thereby to obtain an increase in
 price/ volume of future orders.
 Assuming no discounting for simplicity, the buyer's expected utility is
 (1) U = E{u(Qí9qí)-píQl + [u(Q2,q2)-p2Q2]}9
 where the subscripts 1 and 2 denote the corresponding periods. Note that Ql
 and Q2 are not necessarily supplied by the same seller because the buyer may
 switch at the interim date. The possibility of changing one's trading partner can
 obviously depend on the contents of the initial contract. The decision on the
 form and contents of the initial contract is left to the buyer. The justification
 for this bargaining power of the buyer is competition between potential sellers
 who are all initially identical from the buyer's viewpoint. The sellers have an
 outside option which yields them a per-period utility normalized to zero.
 Given a contract proposal, sellers make acceptance choices, the buyer choos-
 es one among those who accept, and the relationship begins. The expected
 utility of the selected seller as viewed from the outset is :
 (2) V=E{[pl-c-d(ß;x)]Ql+ü2}.
 In (2), v2 represents the seller's second-period utility which, in general, may
 depend on his actions during the first period indirectly through the buyer's
 beliefs about the seller's type. As shown in Bac [1993], a long-term contractual
 arrangement that locks the buyer with a seller for the entire planning horizon
 can do no screening and is dominated by short-term contracts. Let fi(6H | qx)
 denote the buyer's updated beliefs about her trading partner's innate value as
 the one-period contract {p1,Q1} expires. At this stage the buyer makes a
 binary continuation decision denoted b e {0, 1}. If she opts for keeping the
 seller (b - 1), then the parties negotiate the terms of the second contract, a price
 p2 and a quantity Q2 . The buyer's initial contract proposal {p± , Qx] maximizes
 (1) subject to
 (3) (Pi"C)Ql < 0,
 and
 (4) E{[Pl - c - d(ß; x*)]Q, + bo2(p2, Q2)} > 0.
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 The initial contract must eliminate all "bad" seller types who, withholding effort,
 would derive a net benefit from the relationship. This is stated in (3), and can
 be termed the "no free lunch for unwanted seller types" condition. It implies
 (3') Pl < c.
 On the other hand, the relationship must provide the "good" seller types (the
 ¿^-sellers) a nonnegative utility. This is stated in (4). Combining (3') and (4)
 yields the dynamics of prices: px < c < p2.
 The crucial parameter determining the parties' bargaining positions at the
 negotiation stage is the buyer's learning about her trading partner (in fact,
 fi(6H;q) provides the only link between the two periods). For instance, the
 incumbent seller who proves an innate value of 6H enjoys a great advantage
 over outsiders because the buyer will strictly prefer keeping the seller who she
 knows to be of type 0H rather than contracting with another seller of unknown
 type. The expected surplus from continuation of the relationship is strictly
 positive whenever 'i > n.
 Once the parties agree onp2, we let the buyer choose Q2. Using the parties'
 disagreement utilities, we can determine the support of the set including the
 negotiated price p' as a function of 'i. Given the commonly known negotiation
 procedure and rational expectations about the outcome of negotiations, the
 price p% (fi) e [e, p2 (fi)] that will arise from the negotiation process will be
 anticipated in advance. Instead of adopting a specific negotiation model, we
 impose an intuitive condition on the bargaining outcome. We assume that/?£ (fi)
 is an increasing function of 'i. The size of the expected surplus is increasing in
 fi, hence it is natural that the seller captures some of this incremental surplus
 through a higher price. The more the seller convinces the buyer that he is of type
 6H, the higher is his bargaining power, thus the higher the price he can obtain
 for the second contract.3 Given p*(fi) and the buyer's optimal quantity choice
 Q%, we can write the seller's second period welfare as uf (fï) = (p*(fi) - c)Q'.
 Consider now the design of the first contract {pi,Q1} and corresponding
 post-contract strategies. Let S represent the set of first contracts satisfying (3')
 and (4), and let S denote the boundary of S. For each price pt < c, the largest
 3 Notice, however, that the seller who accepts the first contract incurs a welfare loss
 with respect to his outside option during the corresponding period. The seller incurs this
 loss because he foresees that he will improve his bargaining power sufficiently to capture
 some of the surplus in the second period. The seller's relative welfare loss during the first
 period can be interpreted as a relationship-specific investment producting type-related
 information. Since this "output" is useless outside the relationship, the seller will under-
 take the investment only if he expects a quasi-rent from continuation. Expected shifts in
 the parties' bargaining powers are therefore essential in this relationship. They are also
 among major concerns of buyers in real-life vertical relationships. As noted by Mon-
 TEVERDE and Teece [1982], General Motors and Ford have been likely to integrate
 components requiring special engineering to avoid the increase in the suppliers' bargain-
 ing powers.
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 quantity that makes (4) binding (which obviously corresponds to x = 0) yields
 the S locus:
 S= {a, & I (p1 - c)Q, + (/>500 - c)Qt = 0}.
 During the first contract, the selected seller chooses an effort to maximize (2),
 where v2 = (p* (aO - c) Q% and expectations are taken over the effort strategies
 of other seller types, the buyer's beliefs and continuation decision. The com-
 bined strategies of the parties must form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE).
 A continuation equilibrium can be defined as a strategy profile and an up-
 dating rule, excluding the buyer's first-contract offer from the strategies defin-
 ing PBE.
 As in Bac [1993], the buyer interprets a quality higher than the equilibrium
 quality as coming from a 0H-seller because the latter has an absolute innate
 quality advantage over a 0L-seller. We define below jcJ£ (J5), the maximum effort
 that makes the {6L, /f} -seller indifferent between accepting and rejecting the
 first contract, by
 (5) dv-.xm-^-c)*™™-*®.
 Note that x%[ (ft) is increasing in px but decreasing in Qx . The behavior of the
 {6L, P} -seller will be critical in determining the equilibrium effort strategies of
 other seller types. Proposition 1 characterizes continuation equilibria, and the
 properties of a PBE.4
 Proposition 1: (A) Given p* (ju), a unique continuation equilibrium exists. It
 has the following properties: (i) /¿* = 1 and the buyer sets b* = 1 as the
 first contract expires; (ii) 0H-sellers accept and choose the effort
 x$H = max{0, jc^(j5) - (6H - 0L)}; (Hi) all 0L-sellers reject the first contract,
 except the {0L, /?}-seller who is indifferent between rejecting and accepting with
 exerting the effort x^(ß).
 (B) Continuation equilibrium quality is at least 9H. To obtain a higher
 quality, however, the buyer must decrease the quantity and/or increase the
 price specified in the first contract. As for the pattern of prices and qualities :
 PÌ ^P*W and q% > q* - ®h- Furthermore, assuming d2u(Q, q)/dQdq > 0,
 in an interior solution where the seller's effort is not too high we have
 ÔÎ > Ql
 (C) Information about seller's innate values has nonpositive value.
 Two potential classes of PBE arise according to whether 0H- sellers exert effort,
 that is, whether or not the {0L, /?}-seller is able to provide a quality higher than
 4 The proof follows those of propositions 2 and 3 in Bac [1993]. It is omitted here.
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 q = 0H .5 If the equilibrium exhibits no effort, we have [px , Qt} e S, and along
 S all öjj-sellers' participation constraints are identical and binding. The second
 potential class of continuation equilibria exhibits positive effort. In that case we
 have xfL (ß) > 6H - 6L. A 0H-seller expends effort to improve quality thanks to
 the impact of quality on the buyer's posterior beliefs, thereby on the expected
 price that will be negotiated for the second contract.
 The buyer would obviously like to obtain the highest quantity and quality at
 the lowest price, but these goals are in conflict as mentioned in part (B) of
 proposition 1 . Given the surplus that the 0H-seller expects from the second
 contract, varying px and/or Qx affects directly his first-period utility, so the
 seller adjusts his equilibrium effort (hence, quality) accordingly to eliminate the
 possibility of being imitated by a 0L-seller. The behavior of the least effort-
 averse 0L-seller, i.e., the {0L, /?}-seller, plays the key role in this process. A
 sequence of two contracts is a net improvement over a single long-term contract
 that covers both periods.6 Besides directly affecting the buyer's welfare, the low
 price and high volume of exchange specified in the first contract serve screening
 purposes, and effort, if any, comes about as a by-product of this process. Not
 surprisingly, efforts exerted in equilibrium are inefficient except for the {6L, /?}-
 seller who is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the contract. Since all
 0H-sellers exert the s.ame effort (provide the same quality) but differ in their
 costs of effort, their efforts must be less than efficient.
 The intuition behind part (C) of proposition 1 lies in the intertemporal wel-
 fare transfer induced by the contractual arrangement. The low price and high
 quality during the first period more than compensates the buyer for the high
 price she pays during the second period. Similarly, the price for the second
 contract is sufficiently high to offset the seller's cost of effort and the low price
 specified in the first contract. Noncontractible quality is improved indirectly by
 the rat race for the second contract, during which type-related information is
 conveyed.
 5 One can construct other continuation equilibria by modifying the buyer's belief
 system, but most of these beliefs fail an intuitive equilibrium refinement such as Cho and
 Kreps' [1987] criterion. For instance, there is a continuation equilibrium in which no
 agent accepts a given contract satisfying (3') and (4), supported by the buyer's belief (and
 sellers' anticipation of this belief) that she faces a 0H-seller if and only if first-period
 quality is above some sufficiently high threshold. But these beliefs are not sensible becaue
 there are quality signals that cannot be conveyed by a 0L-seller, which should therefore
 convince the buyer that she faces a 0H-seller.
 6 An example is academic contracts, where assistant professors provide both a consid-
 erable flow of services and invest in the quality of their research and teaching in order to
 signal their innate values, thereby avoid being denied tenure. The department (buyer)
 enjoys both type-related information and good performance. Another example is General
 Motors' selecting suppliers on the basis of short-term, fixed-price contracting. A suppli-
 er's winning this year's contract is no guarantee of getting any business next year. See
 Monteverde and Teece [1982] for details.
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 Would the buyer benefit from splitting up his purchase and buying from
 several sources?7 The potential advantage of multiple sourcing is to sample
 quality from several sellers, as the buyer would benefit from being able to pick
 the seller who is the most likely to be of high innate value. Another advantage
 of multiple sourcing may be that it increases the buyer's bargaining power later,
 at the contract renegotiation stage. For instance, if the incumbent sellers com-
 pete à la Bertrand, the buyer would appropriate the whole continuation sur-
 plus, leaving the incumbent sellers with a nonpositive expected surplus from the
 relationship. However, rational sellers who foresee this, will reject the buyer's
 initial multiple sourcing scheme. The possibility of ex-post competition reduces
 (in the limit, eliminates) the effectiveness of the screening process.
 3. The Frequency of Trade
 In the two-period version of our model, the opportunity cost of switching to
 another seller at the interim date is an increasing function of the buyer's
 posterior beliefs. But because learning about the innate value of the incumbent
 seller with noncontractible quality requires at least two periods, the result that
 the buyer does not switch at the interim date whenever 'i > n may be an artefact
 of the two-period assumption. We now investigate the impact of increasing the
 frequency of trade, i.e. the number of periods, on the optimal number and
 length of governing contracts. Farrell and Shapiro's [1989] principle of neg-
 ative protection applies here: whatever their number, contracts should not
 include commitments for contractible variables beyond their termination dates.
 Proposition 2: For any finite number n of periods, the optimal number of
 contracts is two. The first contract C' = {p', Q'} covers the first n-1 periods,
 satisfies the "no free lunch" constraint (n - l)(p* - c)QX < 0 and the partic-
 ipation constraint (n - l)(/?î - c - d(ß' x*))Q' + (p*(l) - c)Q* > 0 where
 /?*(1) and Q* are respectively the price to be negotiated and the quantity
 determined by the buyer for the second contract which covers trade in period n.
 Proof: To see that the first contract must cover the first «-1 periods, consider
 any other contract C = {{px , Qx), . . . , (pm, Qm)} satisfying the "no free lunch"
 constraint for 0L-sellers and the participation constraint of ö^-sellers. This
 contract governs the first m periods where 1 <m<n - l. Assume that it is
 accepted by only 0H-sellers, so that 'i = 1 at the renegotiation stage. The nego-
 tiated price p* (1) for periods j = m + 1, . . . , n would yield the buyer a share of
 the surplus. The incumbent 0H-seller would also obtain a share that would at
 least offset his welfare loss during the first m periods. However, this is not an
 7 We are grateful to a referee for raising this question.
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 equilibrium outcome because the buyer will enhance her welfare by switching
 to another seller with the following contract offer: The price and quantity for
 n - m - 1 periods are such that only 0H-sellers accept to obtain a zero net
 surplus, and this contract covers all remaining periods except the last. Notice
 that quality is again q = 0H. Since the buyer obtains the same quality in both
 options but her switching option makes the new seller's participation constraint
 binding, we conclude that the buyer is better off with the switching option.
 Given the buyer's incentive to switch, no seller will accept the initial contract
 C = {(/?! , Qx), . . . , (pm, Qm)} for all 1 < m < n - 1. This upsets the proposed
 equilibrium, leaving us with the equilibrium contract described in the proposi-
 tion. Given p* (1) > c, one can easily verify that there exist prices {p', ...,/?*_!}
 and quantities {ß*,..., Q„-i} satisfying the two constraints stated in the
 proposition. The parties' continuation equilibrium strategies under this
 contractual arrangement are as described in proposition 1 for the two-period
 case. Q.E.D.
 Proposition 2 shows that the optimal number of contracts is two for any finite
 number of periods, but in the absence of exogenous switching costs the second
 contract covers only the last period. Increasing the number of periods is entirely
 absorbed by the first contract. The intuition is quite simple: to induce screening,
 the buyer must choose an initial contract that results in some relationship-
 specific surplus at the end of the initial contract. If there is more than one period
 left at the end of the initial contract the buyer can always go back to the market,
 offer another screening contract which (as in the t o-period case) attracts only
 high types, induces zero effort and gives all of the resulting surplus to the buyer.
 The buyer cannot do any better by continuing with the seller whom she believes
 to be a high type. Hence, screening is possible only if the initial contract covers
 all but the last period. This result is valid in the absence of switching costs.
 4. The Role of Switching Costs
 We study the impact of increasing the buyer's switching cost beyond the fore-
 gone continuation benefit in a three-period version of this relationship. The
 analysis extends to more than three periods in a natural way. Now there are
 four possible contractual arrangements to govern three periods. First, a single
 long-term contract Ci can be used. The arrangements C2 = {d^, {C22,
 C23} and C3 = {C3l9 C32}, {C33} consist of a sequence of two contracts
 with differential durations; under C2, the first co tract ^2^, governs only
 the first period, whereas {C3l, C32) covers the first two periods under C3.
 T e fourth possible arrangement is C4 = {C4X}9 {C42}, {C43}, where each
 period is governed by one contract; {C42} and {C43} will be determined
 through negotiations, except that the buyer specifies {C4J. In the absence of
 switching costs, proposition 2 stipulates that C2 and C4 are not feasible be-
This content downloaded from 139.179.72.198 on Mon, 30 Oct 2017 10:51:37 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 153/2 (1997) Bilateral Relationships Governed by Incomplete Contracts 329
 cause the buyer will switch. Leaving aside the dominated arrangement C7, the
 only feasible arrangement in the absence of switching costs is therefore C3.
 However, below we show that an appropriate switching cost can make C2
 feasible and even generate a larger total surplus.
 We simplify the model to show most clearly the impact of introducing switch-
 ing costs. Assume that the volume of trade is restricted to one in each period,
 and the parties' per-period utilities are given by u = q - p for the buyer, and
 o = p - c - d(ß; x) for the seller.8
 Consider first the arrangement C3. The probationary contract
 {C3l9C32} = {p^iPÍ3}, where p^3 < c and/?£3 < c, selects the 0H-seller. The
 total surplus from continuation through {C33} = {/?53(1)} is 0H - c> 0, and
 the price /?§3(1) will be determined through negotiations. Letting Zf and Z%
 denote respectively the buyer's and the seller's share of the continuation sur-
 plus, it follows that Zf + Z' = 6H - c. To facilitate the comparison between
 C3 and C2, let us assume that in the continuation equilibrium generated by the
 contract {C3i9 C32} the ö^-seller exerts no effort. In this case the seller's
 overall participation constraint is binding, which means Z' + Z' + Z'= 0.
 Recall that Z' + Z' must be negative from the "no free lunch" constraint. The
 neagtive surplus the seller incurs goes to the buyer, but this loss is exactly offset
 by Z3, the surplus the seller captures later in period 3. Thus the buyer's total
 welfare under arrangement C3 is UC3 = 3(6H - c), which is also the total
 surplus under C3.
 The arrangement C2 is not feasible in the absence of switching costs because,
 as {02^ expires, the buyer can switch and obtain Ud > 2(6H - c), which is
 strictly higher than any continuation welfare she may obtain. We show below
 that if the buyer's switching incentives could somehow be eliminated, C2 would
 become feasible and perhaps dominate C3. A switching cost k such that
 Ud - k < 2 (6H - c) achieves this goal by making continuation in the mutual
 interest of the parties. To confirm our claim, let us choose a switching cost k*
 such that, given the bargaining scheme employed, the incumbent 0H-seller's
 share from the total surplus corresponding to the second contract {C22, C23}
 is 2Z3 (twice the surplus resulting from the contract {C33}). Since this surplus
 is strictly higher than Zs3, it will generate ex-ante competition, and equilibrium
 effort during {C2X} may become positive so that quality q^2 > 6H. The overall
 participation constraint of the seller under arrangement C2 with a switching
 cost of k* is thus/?^2 - c - d(ß; jc*) + 2Z' > 0, and the buyer's total utility is
 Va = cR1 - pT + 2(0 H - c) - 2Z% where we used the fact that
 Zf = (0H - c) - Z%. We are now ready to compare C2 and C3. Let (/>(/?; d)
 denote the inverse of d(ß; x).
 8 With this simplification the parameter ß of the effort disutility function has no role
 to play. Without loss of generality, we shall accordingly assume the quality-effort disutil-
 ity function of all sellers is d (fi; x).
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 Proposition 3 : Assume </> (ß; /??3 4- p? - 2c + (Z'¡2)) < 0H - 0L < </> (/?; p^2
 - c + 2Z'). The total surplus under C2 (TSC2) with a switching cost of k* is
 strictly higher than under C3 (TSC3).
 The assumption stated in proposition 3 is derived from the equilibrium con-
 dition (5) defining x^L(p)9 the maximum effort that a 0L-seller can exert to
 imitate the equilibrium quality provided by a 0H-seller. The assumption states
 that equilibrium effort is positive under C2 with the switching cost k* but zero
 under C3. This, of course, depends on the curvature of d(ß; x) and hence also
 on its inverse, (j)(fi; d).
 Proof: We know that TSC3 = 3 (6H - c). Under C2 the total surplus is
 TSC2 = q^2 - c - d(ß; x$H) + 2(9 H - c). By comparing the two surpluses, we
 obtain TSC3 < TSC2 if an only if qQ2 - d(ß;x$H) > 0H, which simplifies to
 x*h > d($' x$H). This condition holds in equilibrium. To see this, note that if px
 is optimal the first-order condition <'>' = 1 must hold. Since </>(/?; .) is the inverse
 of d(ß; .), (j>' = ' can be expressed as dd(ß;x^L(P))/dx = 1. But since
 x*h = jc£ (J5) + (0H - 0L), we must have dd(ß; x$H)/dx < 1. Strict convexity of
 d(P; x) in x implies that x$H > d(ß' x$H). Q.E.D.
 Note that if the seller's surplus 2Z% under C2 is not sufficiently high to induce
 effort, then the buyer would obtain the same surplus from the two arrange-
 ments. The form of the intertemporal welfare transfer induced through the
 arrangement C2 plays a key role in inducing effort when the buyer is almost
 locked-in. Ex-ante the buyer has the power to manipúlate/?" and capture most
 of the seller's overall surplus. Part of the surplus transferred to the buyer may
 be in the form of a better quality. This may generate a Pareto improvement.
 Such intertemporal welfare transfers allow the parties to capture part of the
 surplus otherwise left unexplored due to contract incompleteness.9 This brings
 us to a perhaps obvious but important point. Higher switching costs can
 enhance welfare only if another contractible variable (duration of contracts) is
 appropriately modified; a higher switching cost per se cannot increase the total
 surplus. This is why we compared C2 and C3, two arrangements that differ in
 contract lengths. Finally, it should be noted that the level of the switching cost
 underlying this result is a critical magnitude. A low value of k may not be
 sufficient to eliminate the buyer's switching incentives even when the incumbent
 seller proves to be of type 6H, so C2 may not even be feasible. Very large
 switching costs on the other hand may lock-in the buyer completely; they may
 shift all the bargaining power away to the seller, reducing the buyer's surplus
 to zero.
 The discussion above brings in the notion of optimal friction in relationships
 when contracts are necessarily incomplete and information is asymmetric.
 9 Similar arguments can be used to show that the arrangement C4 becomes feasible
 z/an appropriate switching cost is introduced.
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 Some friction exists naturally in every relationship in the form of search and
 selection costs, but the parties can also artificially create friction through can-
 cellation fees very similar to Shavell's [1980], [1984] damage payments and
 Williamson's [1983] hostages. Because potential gains from intertemporal wel-
 fare transfers are larger, a cancellation fee will most likely enhance the buyer's
 welfare if the frequency of trade (the number of periods) is high.10 The buyer's
 gain will be an increased efficiency of screening due to a better allocation of
 time among the two contracts, and this gain may well outbalance the cost of
 losing some bargaining power to the seller at the interim negotiation stage.
 Several aspects of relationships considered as generating inefficiencies may
 have potentially beneficial roles in a world of incomplete contracts.
 5. Summary and Conclusions
 The basic buyer-seller framework presented in this paper is essentially a shirk-
 ing model, as it is familiar from the efficiency wage literature. The buyer is in
 need of a good or a service that can be produced by a seller. The number of
 potential sellers is large but quality is not contractible so that the only contract
 that screens the seller types includes a price-quantity pair. In the one-period
 version of the model, the seller will find it optimal to exert no effort to improve
 quality, hence the buyer will offer a price that just covers the seller's cost of
 producing the lowest quality. We extend the framework in Bac [1993] and show
 that in the equilibrium of a multi-period relationship the buyer can use an initial
 contract (price and quantity) to screen seller types. This multi-period extension
 also provides insights about the number of contracts in a discrete-time frame-
 work, the role of switching costs, and the impact of the frequency of trade on
 contract terms.
 The analysis shows that the unit price is increasing from the first contract to
 the second, whereas quality and volume of trade are nonincreasing. As men-
 tioned in section 1 , these dynamics accord well with the empirical evidence on
 the dynamics of wages and performance in the labor context, thus suggesting
 that learning about innate values plays an important role in determining the
 terms of labor contracts. An interesting example where contract incompleteness
 is plain is academics. Assistant professors provide extra effort in order to signal
 their teaching and research abilities, and thereby avoid being denied tenure.
 10 Recall that in the absence of switching costs the optimum arrangement consists of
 two contracts where the second contract covers the last period. Since in equilibrium the
 total surplus in the last period is limited by 9H - c and the first contract is too long with
 /?!<<:, the seller does not have much incentive to exert effort. Hence a shorter duration
 for the first contract is likely to generate higher effort, which improves quality early in
 the relationship at the cost of letting the seller capture a higher surplus later on. This
 intertemporal welfare transfer may improve the buyer's welfare.
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 When contracts are incomplete, switching costs and hidden information -
 generally thought of as sources of inefficiencies - have potentially beneficial
 effects. In the buyer-seller relationship considered in this paper, increasing the
 buyer's switching cost can enhance her own welfare by allowing for a better
 allocation of time among the two contracts. Since a sufficiently high switching
 cost checks the hazard of termination, the duration of the first contract can be
 made shorter if this improves the efficiency of the screening process. As a result,
 the seller's "expected return" on effort (which produces type-information
 specific to the relationship) becomes nonnegative. The equilibrium will exhibit
 higher effort because there is ex-ante competition among seller types and the
 second-contract price depends on the first-contract quality through the buyer's
 posterior beliefs. The size of the switching cost is critical. Too much of it will
 harm the buyer by reducing her bargaining power while a switching cost too
 small may not be sufficient to generate the mentioned desirable effect.
 We close the paper with a remark. Viewed as a screening model, this paper
 can be classified in the literature on rat races. Comparing the excessive effort
 outcomes of rat races with the first-best outcomes derived in standard princi-
 pal-agent models where effort is priced on a piece rate basis has led many
 authors to conclude that rat races are likely to generate inefficient outcomes
 (see for instance Akerlof [1976] and Lazear and Rosen [1981]). This conclu-
 sion is clearly true when one adopts complete piece-rate contracts as a bench-
 mark. Since many real-life contracting practices involve incompleteness and
 have little in common with sophisticated contracts, an incomplete contracts
 framework seems to be more appropriate as a benchmark. That is to say,
 contrasting the hidden-information (rat race) case with the perfect information
 case in incomplete contracts frameworks can contribute better to our under-
 standing of screening properties of real-life contractual arrangements. In a
 simplified version of our model we have shown that rat races may generate
 welfare-enhancing outcomes; they provide both information and quality.
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